After September 11

Photo by Michael Rieger/FEMA News Photo

Editor's Note: *The short pieces presented in this section are "quick responses" to the attacks of September 11. In time, this journal will publish longer, more scholarly considerations of the urban technical consequences of those attacks, but these early responses give some indication of the direction those considerations might take. The first piece, by Thomas Birkland, argues that experts must find—and project—their voices into the policy arena after "focusing events." These short papers carry the "voices" of experts—voices policy makers should heed.*

Expertise and Policy Change After "Focusing Events"

Thomas. A. Birkland

THE September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon have triggered one of the most challenging periods of public policy making in U.S. history. In my book, *After Disaster*, I draw on John Kingdon's "streams" metaphor of the public policy process to describe how "focusing events"—large, well-known events such as accidents and disasters—focus public and elite attention on policy failures and create opportunities for finding solutions to these failures.

While a focusing event does not necessarily lead to policy change, the September 11 attacks were so profound that they have already led to changes in policy, and more changes are forthcoming. While many of these changes are technical—how we search airline passengers and their baggage, for example—the thrust of our policy changes will become clearer once we have reached some sort of understanding of what the problems revealed by September 11 actually were.

There are many ways that the failures or problems revealed by the attacks can be constructed: as failures of national security and intelligence, failures of urban infrastructure, including lifelines, failures in building design, and failures in properly conceptualizing the nature and role of the built environment. These depictions are not mutually exclusive; rather, the fact that so many definitions exist reflects the extreme complexity of the challenges we face and the dizzying array of possible policy tools we can employ to address the problems.

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While the attacks were very shocking and are unique in most Americans' living memory, the problem areas just enumerated are neither new nor unique and have been on professional agendas for many years. The potential threat of terrorism was well known, but so were the other problems described here. Many of these issues were known because those who study the social, political, and economic aspects of natural disasters had already raised them in numerous studies. The difference between natural disasters and acts of terrorism is that we cannot dismiss the destruction of the WTC as an "act of God" for which we may believe that there is no real way to prepare (even though such a supposition is not entirely true). It may well be right from a moral and a political perspective to find and punish those responsible. But our response to the damage to the buildings and the urban environment will look more like the response to natural hazard than to an act of war, because the effects—the physical destruction of the built environment—are the same.

If we accept this premise, we must be prepared for the consequences of the policy failures revealed in the attack. This is where post-September 11 policy making will become difficult, because there are so many ideas about what to do next. Some ideas will be "good," and others will be "bad," but how we separate good ideas from bad ones will be based on a set of social, political, economic, and technical criteria for what is a good or bad idea. These criteria are *not* "objective," but are entirely based on values, traditions, and cultural predispositions and are expressed through our political and social organizations. Successful ideas may, therefore, be politically popular and technically unsound, while technically sound but politically unpopular ideas (a national ID card, for example) may not be advanced. It is worth noting, however, that the September 11 attacks were so profound that some cultural predispositions—in favor of personal privacy, for example—have begun to erode.

Expertise will be important in advancing sound ideas for addressing the attacks. I do not presume to believe that technical expertise is purely neutral. I am more concerned about a much more basic issue: that technical expertise may have a very small role to play, and the debate will be ceded to those with little or no technical expertise regarding what is more likely to "work" in the future.

In research on earthquakes and hurricanes in the United States between 1960 and 1993, I found that, between big earthquakes, the scientific and engineering communities were very active in providing information to Congress about what steps could be taken to mitigate earthquake hazards. There was no such community that actively promoted solutions to hurricane problems. Today, there is a natural

hazards caucus in Congress, and a wind hazards group that brings together researchers to address wind hazards, but the technical community that deals with hurricanes is still far less prominent than its counterpart in earthquake policy. The result is that politically popular, but technically inadequate, solutions—primarily disaster relief payments—dominate hurricane policy, while earthquake policy reflects continuous learning about earthquake dynamics that is then applied to policy change.

"Factors Inhibiting..."
"Focusing Events,..."

It is important that experts engage in this process; in this case, experts include urban planners, social scientists, community leaders, and, indeed, the people who live and work on the southern tip of Manhattan. The lesson from disaster research is clear: policy makers will not seek expertise—experts must make themselves available, sometimes aggressively, as "policy entrepreneurs" who market expertise that policy makers and the public can understand. As Georges Clemenceau said, "War is too important to leave to the generals." So too redevelopment is too important to be left to the bankers and developers without sound expert advice from those who know how urban systems work.

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Approaches to Redeveloping the World Trade Center Site, Lower Manhattan, and the New York Metropolitan Region

Robert E. Paaswell

SEMPTEMBER 11 marks a day of great discontinuities in New York and the United States. When terrorists demolished the World Trade Center site, they affected our personal and collective psychology as much as, or greater than our physical landscape. One very short month later, there is an overwhelming need to revisit and fix that landscape as well as heal our hearts. Unlike an ordinary urban development problem, one where a site is cleared and architects hold charettes and competitions to provide for highest and best use, this problem is different. Thousands of people, from all over the world, remain, and will always remain there; simultaneously, the site will be remembered as the place where the Golden Age of the twentieth century of the United States came to dramatic closure. New York, the dynamic global capital that it is, must plan to develop the site anew, using some fundamental guidelines:

- The first is that the site belongs to the world. While the World Trade Center towers were named to reflect New York City's place in the global market, the new development will reflect the world converging on this site as a symbol of freedom, realized aspirations, and global diversity.

- The very dynamics of New York, that which makes it unique, have been reflected in its density and agglomerations of activities. Rebuilding the site must account for this drive for agglomeration, business innovation, and great work force diversity.

- The site, one of the most valuable in the world, derives much of that value from its accessibility—the ability to move large numbers of people to and from the region within reasonable travel times.

- The accessibility comes, mainly, from rail transit. The MTA and PATH served the site. It is a point of great interconnectivity. Access to the WTC area stimulated the development of housing, schools, shops, a waterfront park, and other activities. Access must remain high.

- The redevelopment and regrowth process is a dynamic process—and this is fundamental. A strategic approach to redevelopment is necessary: one that combines very short-term (less than one year), short-term (less than five years), and long-term approaches. The redevelopment of infrastructure is integral with the uses of land and activities and the evolving land uses that will occur on these three time scales.

A strategic process is critical; it examines the availability and characteristics of resources: financial, land, materials, human, and institutional. It examines constraints and sets forth opportunities and will allow those in the region to measure progress of redevelopment against a set of regional goals. Such a process can be inclusionary, yet bounded, and provide a vision of accomplishment and achievement to the region.

First Considerations

Any strategic planning must account for:

- *Quality of Life*. What must be recognized at the outset is that the events that precipitated the need to plan, are events that greatly affected the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of people. Considerations of security and safety must now be included in plans to restore the quality of life, the first objective of any strategic plan.

- *Economic Growth.* In the decade before September 11, New York City had gone through a period of unprecedented economic growth. That growth was slowing, yet it established lower Manhattan as the center of the world economy, bringing together, finance, real estate, commerce, and the businesses and services that supported them in a dense, stimulating, and highly entrepreneurial environment. Can this level of activity—a level that made the average income of those in this area 50 percent higher than the average in the rest of New York City—be recreated? What will be the roles of high tech and information technology in the restructuring of this local (yet global) economy? What economic stimuli and levels of financing are necessary to hit economic development targets? And what would realistic development targets be?

- *Dispersion vs. Centralization.* A major debate concerning concentration of activities will be part of the process. The thrust towards dispersion is a natural response to the WTC destruction. In fact, dispersion is necessary now in order for businesses to be sustained. But the underlying rationale for centralization and agglomeration will remain. How close do deal makers wish to be to each other? To sustain a financial industry as inventive, competitive and ahead of the curve as New York's has been, what clusters of what magnitude must be in place?

- *Connectivity.* The WTC site represents a significant portion of the economic activity of the region; but it is only a *portion* of that economic activity. There are layers of reconnections that must take place, and this will occur with discussions about growing other locations—the outer boroughs, New Jersey, Connecticut—for economic growth. The layers begin with lower Manhattan, reach through complimentary and competing locations, and end with necessary global connections through the region's airports. Understanding the importance of this connectivity leads to an understanding of the importance of infrastructure.

Infrastructure's Key Role

Even this brief skeletal listing of issues illustrates the complexities of planning for the infrastructure investments that have to be made in the restoration. Because of this, it will be necessary to tie objectives and resources to plans that can be achieved within specified periods of

time. Although the attacks accelerated and exacerbated an economic downturn, a period of growth and expansion must be planned for, and reaching levels of activity, similar to those prior to September 11, must be incorporated into the objectives. These activities must be supported and stimulated by infrastructure. High capital investments take long periods of time; the rebuilding of the site must be accompanied by a period of flexible transportation improvements, ranging from the very short term to the long term. The long-term investments must also meet standards of regional economic enhancement.

Very Short Term

Very short-term projects (less than one year) might have local transportation providers offering van, small bus, and other similar services to lower Manhattan as it undergoes change through rebuilding and dynamic job relocations. These might be provided through open market bidding (perhaps to the Taxi and Limousine Commission, or to the New York City Department of Transportation, to the Mayor's Office of Transportation, or to the Lower Manhattan Business Improvement District). The service would be dynamic in that routes would change as the construction patterns change. They might also change between daytime (linking Penn Station and Grand Central Terminal to lower Manhattan, or to available subway stops) and night time routes. Pedestrian and bicycle routes would also be established, not only to accommodate non-motorized means of travel, but to encourage and support them and make them attractive. Information kiosks on transportation and how to connect with it (i.e., computer terminals) can be set up throughout lower Manhattan to provide information on the available systems, making them more attractive. All public transit alternatives, regardless of provider, should take MetroCards. Auto policies, to ease congestion due to limited street access in lower Manhattan, can be used as trials for long-term strategies to reduce congestion, without limiting access. These would include Single Occupant Vehicle limits on bridges and tunnels, road pricing, and parking policy modifications. Commencing in the short term, the movement of goods by truck must be addressed. Delivery of goods are vital for commerce and daily life—yet, no one wants to see trucks. Truck access by location, time of day, size of vehicle, and parking availability—all must be a part of the redevelopment strategy.

Short Term

Short-term projects (less than five years) should address street improvements and the addition of Intelligent Transportation Systems

(ITS) to street and transit networks. Bus lanes as well as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) can begin to address capacity needs as the activity in the region grows to previous levels. Simultaneously, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), New Jersey Transit (NJT), and PATH must develop a plan for the reconstruction of damaged rail lines and the reconfiguration of lines through lower Manhattan to provide high capacity and to meet the movement needs of 2020 and beyond. The MTA can address modernization of communications and signaling more aggressively—not only to add capacity and reliability to the system, but to make the system more responsive in a crisis. The MTA must also review station designs to insure quick access and egress during emergencies and develop procedures to evacuate stations—especially high volume stations—during emergencies.

Long Term

A number of suggestions have been proposed in the transportation community to improve regional transportation. In addition to rail extensions, new connections and new or enlarged stations, bus rapid transit and light rail additions have been suggested. Plans for roads and parking involve the introduction and expansion of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), pricing strategies, and strategies limiting the access Single Occupant Vehicles have to the most congested areas of Manhattan. Investment in ITS is essential in establishing any regional auto and truck-use policies.

Conclusion

Finally, these strategies must be put into the context of the organizations that develop, implement, and operate them. It may be that the structure of the existing transportation agencies will have to change or that new agencies will have to be put in place to deal with the new complexities of the planning and delivery of twenty-first century infrastructures. And, of course, there is the pressing issue of financing regional redevelopment. After the federal contribution to the restoration has been expended and bond limits used, there will still be monumental needs. Innovative financing—coupled with innovations in building and operating infrastructures—will be needed. Examples in Europe and Asia exist already. These two aspects, institutional change and innovative financing are the most critical factors in restoration of the World Trade Center site, a restoration that will have an enormous impact on the growth and development of the entire metropolitan region.

To Rebuild New York—Strengthen the Maritime Connection

Roberta E. Weisbrod

AFTER the attack and collapse of the World Trade Center, a cloud of ash and debris covered all of lower Manhattan, and escape routes were few since subway lines in the area were closed. In the rush to safety, many people were trapped at the water's edge; some even jumped into the Hudson River to flee the danger.

The maritime sector rushed to help and came immediately, on their own extraordinary initiative, and without any external coordination. They rescued people from the water, and they ferried people clinging to the shore away from the disaster to safety. In fact, the maritime sector, the owners and operators of work boats, barges, tugs, ferries, etc., were commended by the Captain of the Port of New York for their leadership in guiding the activities of the Coast Guard in this crisis.

Starratt
Fleisher
"Waterways Keep..."

Besides the rescue of people, the maritime sector played a host of critical roles in a venue where virtually all the roads were impassable. Fireboats were needed to spray the burning rubble; even antique fireboats were pressed into service. Ferries brought doctors, volunteers, and supplies to and from the site. Vessels carried the dead to morgues and vessels took the massive amounts of debris directly to the Staten Island landfill for the FBI's criminal examination. *The Spirit of New York*, an excursion boat, became a commissary for the rescuers—because it generated its own electricity. When falling debris inactivated ferry docks, other piers were quickly upgraded for service, with dredging taking place overnight.

Lipton

As this is being written a month after the horror, the maritime sector continues to play a critical role. Ferry ridership has continued at levels more than double normal loads, as road traffic continues to

be slowed. Private operators have procured extra vessels, and the city itself also started a new public ferry service from Brooklyn near the Verrazano Bridge at a pier with a substantial parking lot to serve some commuters from Staten Island and New Jersey.

Benefits of Maritime Transport

Before the horrible events, many of us had been calling for a major buildout of maritime transport—to move goods and people and to open up new waterfront redevelopment areas that are poorly served by public transport. Congestion would be relieved, businesses would get reliable service, and air quality and noise levels would improve.

Now is the time to create a better New York City, one that is less congested, more unified among the boroughs and within the region, easier to get around in, and even more exhilarating. The maritime system would have four components: (1) water taxis for getting business people to and from business areas in lower Manhattan and midtown and to and from new business areas in DUMBO, Williamsburg, Red Hook, and Newark Bay; (2) additional large ferries to transport people to and from airports and high-volume commuter areas; (3) freight ferries to carry high-value, time-sensitive goods to and from the business districts and the airports; and (4) barge transport for rail floats, containers, and truck trailers within the harbor and to and from other ports on the East Coast.

Compared to other forms of transportation infrastructure proposals that could be put in place—highways and bridges, subway and rail, maritime transport can be done the quickest and cheapest. The reason is that the landings can be very simple: floating barges serve until more extensive elaborate docks are built—Pier 11 at Wall Street, now quite elegant, is a good model for that concept. And because water taxis, ferries, and barges are shallow draft, there is no need for extensive dredging, and in most cases, no need for dredging at all.

How would this be accomplished? I believe that the "permanent government" of metropolitan New York, the business sector working in concert with the major civic organizations, would be the ones to devise and advocate for the plan. The critical players in particular are the Chambers of Commerce. A model for this proposal exists in the San Francisco Bay area. After each of several disasters, mud slides, subway fires, and a major earthquake, ferries proved their effectiveness in carrying goods and people across the bay. In the late 1990s, the Bay Area Council, composed of businesses and civic organizations, needed to solve an ongoing crisis, the horrendous congestion

that was costing the area $3.5 billion in lost time, etc. They proposed a transportation plan whose central feature was a water transit initiative. The plan, $600 million for Phase I, and up to $2 billion for full build out, is in the process of implementation through a government entity set up to achieve it. The plan encompasses freight as well as passenger ferry transport.

Bay Area Council

Marine Transport for New York

Specifically what could be done in the metropolitan New York region and how much would it cost?

Phase I, Disaster Recovery. While numerous subway lines are blocked going into lower Manhattan, we should rapidly institute additional water transit service. Water taxis (the cost varies, depending upon the number of vessels) could be instituted for well under $10 million. The service could be up and fully running in the spring, some connections earlier. Immediate subsidization of ferry landings that could be used by several waterborne transport services would be the appropriate role of government. A very modest amount of governmental support in setting up landings and in offering loan guarantees for vessel construction would allow this service to happen quickly. (This has already begun. A major New York City real estate developer, Douglas Durst, invested in New York Water Taxi and service is scheduled to recommence in June 2002. Government agencies provided modest but necessary assistance.)

Cuozzo

Phase II, A Better Metro New York. In this phase, ferry landings would be constructed by the public sector and vessels would be acquired by the private sector (with governmental loan guarantees). Metropolitan Transit Authority buses would be routed to accommodate the passenger ferries, and bus landings would offer real-time electronic information about expected arrivals. Freight and passenger ferries would serve the airports and the downtown central business districts. Full build out would be in the order of twenty vessels and up to ten more landings, and depending on the size of full build out, this could be accomplished for under $100 million. The timing depends on how long it takes to construct and/or acquire the vessels, about 12-18 months.

Phase III, Restore Quality of Life and Economic Opportunity. To avoid the vicious cycle of highway trucks on city streets with the accompanying noise, congestion, pollution, and road destruction, and the diversion of scarce transport funds toward repair of truck damage rather than new starts, enhanced maritime transport of goods to and

from and within the city is needed. This would solve what have become major quality of life/health issues and would keep our lifelines open. Improving our ability to move all freight by water, within New York harbor, and from New York harbor to other East Coast cities, would alleviate congestion and would cost about $100-150 million, with another $500 million to usefully improve connecting rail freight lines. A port in Brooklyn would require this advanced inter-harbor maritime transport and would itself be an enormous income generator for the region, achieved at low cost.

Weisbrod

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Transportation Security: The Energy Dimension

Anthony Perl and Joseph S. Szyliowicz

THE Bush administration's effort to implement a national energy policy deserves special attention in the wake of the recent tragedy and the "war on terrorism." Energy security is a critical part of national security, but U.S. oil imports have more than doubled since 1985. They now account for more than half of our consumption and are projected to continue growing. Experts agree that domestic oil production cannot meet such demand. Even if the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge were completely drained of oil, the estimated 6.3 billion-barrel reserve would substitute for less than two years' worth of imports at the 1999 rate of 9.6 million barrels a day. National security, not abstract virtue, dictates reducing our oil consumption.

Oil has been used as a powerful weapon in our lifetimes. The oil shocks of the early 1970s had devastating impacts upon national economies and societies and entailed the transfer of hundreds of billions of dollars to oil producers. Some of this windfall made its way into the hands of extremist groups that have now demonstrated their capacity for mass murder in America.

While it is highly unlikely that U.S. policies against terrorism would trigger a replay of the 1973 oil embargo, the flow of oil could be endangered. Iraq, Libya, the Sudan, or even Iran could become targets of the U.S. antiterrorist campaign, or might cut back their production to demonstrate sympathy with American targets. However, other producers such as Saudi Arabia (which accounts for 16 percent of U.S. oil imports), Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, could easily make up any export reductions, though probably with a

strategic price attached. A more immediate danger is posed by the threat of terrorist attacks against the major Persian Gulf oil loading ports.

Although a revitalized U.S. energy policy cannot mitigate a supply crisis in the near term, it is necessary to embrace conservation as a significant long-term contributor to national security. Such a policy must be designed to avoid economic damage to friendly Middle Eastern states, since doing so would play to the extremists' strategy of dividing the West from Arab/Islamic states and could lead to political instability. What should such a policy look like?

Transportation is critical. Petroleum accounts for 97 percent of all the energy used in this sector which accounts for 66 percent of total petroleum use, mostly for passenger vehicles. A wise energy policy would thus aim for conservation, diversification, and redundancy in fueling American transportation.

Regulatory and fiscal policies were proven to be effective stimuli of transportation fuel efficiency in the wake of 1973's oil shock. Significant improvement in automotive fuel economy could be realized if any future tax cuts were targeted to encourage scrapping older vehicles and purchasing high-mileage replacements. Volkswagen's diesel-powered Lupo currently attains 99 miles per gallon with a conventional, albeit lightweight, diesel engine. Hybrid vehicles that mix gasoline and electric propulsion, like Toyota's Prius and Honda's Insight, can do even better. Detroit could add value, for both its shareholders and the world as a whole, if American manufacturers begin cranking out equivalent vehicles sooner rather than later.

Government can create incentives that encourage people to embrace more energy-efficient transportation. One example is the "fee-bate"—a revenue-neutral tax scheme where revenues collected from higher taxes on SUVs and other gas guzzlers would be directed to lowering taxes (or even generating rebates) for purchasing high-mileage and hybrid vehicles. This would create no new tax drag on a shrinking economy while stimulating auto production.

Additional steps could also be taken to align aviation's economic recovery with energy conservation. Ailing airlines should receive antitrust exemptions to "pool" flights, under appropriate government oversight. It makes no sense to send two (or more) half-full planes an hour between major cities. The goal, much as we hate to say it from the viewpoint of frequent coach class fliers, should be to keep loads at or above 70 percent whenever possible. The same consolidation options should be offered to air freight carriers.

Freight transport also uses too much energy. A British study found that "just in time" delivery systems use almost twice as much energy as traditional warehousing. Reorienting freight logistics to

conserve energy could help solve the larger problem of economic disruption, as occurred after September 11 when low inventories and lack of storage facilities interrupted the supply chain. Governments need to consider lowering property taxation of warehouses and other storage facilities, treating them as extensions of the, largely untaxed, transport infrastructure where more and more of America's inventory has gravitated in recent years.

Another policy objective should be to diversify fuels used in transportation. Measures to increase use of proven electric traction on rail lines across the country and through light rail transit and trolley-buses in urban areas should be part of America's energy policy.

Accelerating biofuels production, such as ethanol from cereal crops, and commercializing new crops that can produce even more energy ought to be policy priorities. Non-motorized transportation like bikes, blades, scooters, and walking also need to be promoted and facilitated. Nor should long-term measures such as land-use planning and the development of a national high-speed rail system be overlooked.

Such policies should be monitored carefully to ensure that the anticipated savings are realized. Setting a benchmark for attaining these goals—perhaps a one-percent reduction of oil consumption per year—would allow progress to be measured. If these approaches do not reach the target, then other measures can be considered.

Before September 11, many experts argued that "getting the prices right" would solve the congestion, efficiency, and pollution problems that plague our existing transportation system. Adjusting taxes and subsidies so that drivers would pay more of the costs they create was never politically popular. But in today's tougher times, the cost of conservation measures is likely to be far less than the sacrifices which might arise should energy imports constrain America's security strategy and cost lives both at home and abroad.

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Missing Linkages

Robin Leichenko and Amy Glasmeier

THE destruction of the World Trade Center has led to a flurry of discussions concerning the need for a rethinking of urban geography and urban form in an era of global terrorism. This event also suggests a need for a rethinking of economic geography.

Through our study of economic globalization, we have gained a deep understanding of production networks, firm location strategies, and international production patterns. We have also contributed to a more nuanced understanding of tensions in the changing role of the nation-state in a globalized world. The fact that the enemy of the United States in this "first war of the new millennium" is not a nation-state, but a nearly invisible global network, suggests that our thinking on these issues has been on-track. We understand that this tragedy is somehow connected to economic globalization, yet we also recognize that our canvas heretofore has been too narrow.

Questions of inequality and the cultural, historical, and political dimensions of globalization—all of which are implicated in the destruction of the World Trade Center—have been given relatively little attention in studies of the economic geography of economic globalization. Economists, cultural and urban geographers, historians, and others, have of course, addressed these topics, but they have played a secondary role in economic geography. In particular, we have paid relatively little attention to inequality in the distributional consequences of economic globalization. Unequivocal evidence indicates that inequality has been rising over the past thirty years, both within and across nations in countries at all levels of per capita consumption. *

* Rather than using the common distinctions between "advanced" and "developing" countries, it seems more pertinent to distinguish between countries based on level of per capita consumption, since this comes closer to the essence of economic differences between countries. We, therefore, use the term "marginalized" countries to refer to nations where per capita incomes are insufficient to provide a minimum standard of living based on food availability, clean water, and shelter requirements.

In marginalized countries, the rates of economic growth from 1980 to 1998 were significantly lower in every region of the world (except East Asia, before its 1998 downturn) than they were in the previous 20 years. For Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita income grew by 36 percent from 1960 to 1980; for the same region it *fell* by 15 percent from 1980 to 1998. In Latin America, GDP per capita grew by 75 percent from 1960 to 1980; in the following years from 1980 to 1998, it has only risen by 6 percent overall, about one-third of one percent per year. Although 14 countries have seen economic growth that was significantly more rapid in the latter period of rapid globalization than before the onset of the process (and most of them are developing countries), 89 countries (77 percent of the nations for which data were available)—developed and developing alike—experienced significant declines in their rates of growth in the latter period. At the same time, the spread of global communications has raised awareness of these inequalities, thus fomenting sentiment against those of us who "have." As one of the "root causes" of terrorists' actions, rising inequality and its consequences clearly merit more attention. But rising inequality represents only one dimension of what caused the destruction on September 11: inequality might be better understood as a necessary condition to foment the level of hatred required to carry out a suicidal terrorist attack, but it is not sufficient.

Weisbrot et al.

Weisbrot et al.

Kennedy

The events of September 11, 2001 also had a cultural dimension. For many residents of marginalized countries, the United States has become synonymous with the imperialist spread of global capitalism, which brings high-priced consumption goods such as fast-food and sneakers and violent or sexualized images from English-speaking films and television programs.* While we, as economic geographers, often discuss the homogenization of consumption as a component of globalization, the interrelated cultural effects (and threats) brought by Western consumption goods have been relatively ignored, or perhaps paid only lip service by those of us who live and work in high-consumption countries such as the United States. Yet, a cultural-imperialist interpretation of these events also seems insufficient.

There are also deeper religious and historical dimensions to the events of September 11, 2001—dimensions that many of us are not even equipped with the knowledge of world history or religion to understand. Hence, we initially called the war against terrorism a "crusade" without realizing that this term may be deeply offensive to our Muslim friends. It is clear that the Islamic religion in no way sanctions terrorism. Yet, the fact that religious differences have again become tools to justify mass-murder is undeniable. The linkage between globalization and religion represents nearly uncharted terri-

* As the financial component of the attacks is unraveled, it is ironic that the profits of global corporations likely played an important, if indirect, role in financing terrorist networks. The stock market boom of the 1990s may have, indeed, provided a share of the capital used to fund these destructive efforts.

tory for economic geographers. And, yet, its heredity is undeniably linked to global economic history.

But the roots of this tragedy also lie much closer to home and suggest the need to re-examine recent U.S. history. For fifty years, as the Western industrialized nations laid claim to the governance structures of international organizations designed to ensure their prosperity, less developed or marginalized countries repeatedly reminded us that those same institutions with names like "the World Bank," the "International Monetary Fund," and the "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," were supposed to bring opportunity to the world, not just to the industrialized nations. But the world was not prepared to make the commitment to such heroic and costly actions. Indeed, the isolationism that characterized America in the early part of the twentieth century had not entirely worn off; in fact it too lay just below the surface of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States, the only intact industrial economy, was not prepared to take on the responsibility to develop the world in its entirety and thus made choices based on strategic assets and the fear of possible limited geopolitical retaliation.

The actions of September 11 suggest there may be some value in looking back to the time of the end of the Second World War and the recognition on the part of the industrialized countries that the lack of willingness to stabilize and bring prosperity to regions of the world could result in a return to horrific uncertainty. Rather than looking back on Pearl Harbor to identify an unknown enemy, would we not be better off to look at how we tried to understand and formulate a path that offered political and economic opportunity for vulnerable and desperate populations. Both the Marshall Plan and American side payments after the Second World War were central to providing hope and the prospect of opportunity for those ravaged by war. And we bought more than time with these gestures, as the development experience of the NIEs suggest, we bought opportunity, not perfect opportunity, but recognizable opportunity, nonetheless. We desperately need to look back to when we explicitly sought to spread the gains of economic development. Our actions were focused and deliberate. The imperative was clear and the path unambiguous.

The inextricable links between the economic, political, cultural, and historical dimensions of global change and its distributional consequences were brought home on September 11. There is no longer an economy or an economic geography that can be seen as operating apart from cultural, historical, and political processes. Better recognition and understanding of these linkages is a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence among all people.

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